Consistent Conjectural Variations Equilibrium in a Mixed Oligopoly with a Labor Input Function
- Authors: Vyacheslav V. Kalashnikov, Vitaliy V. Kalashnikov Jr, Aarón Arévalo Franco, Felipe J. Castillo Pérez4
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View Affiliations Hide Affiliations4 Department of Systems and Industrial Engineering (IIS), Tecnolgico de Monterrey (ITESM), Campus Monterrey, Ave. Eugenio Garza Sada 2501 Sur, Monterrey 64849, Mexico.
- Source: Firms' Strategic Decisions: Theoretical and Empirical Findings: Volume 1 , pp 114-138
- Publication Date: April 2015
- Language: English
Consistent Conjectural Variations Equilibrium in a Mixed Oligopoly with a Labor Input Function, Page 1 of 1
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The present chapter studies conjectured variations equilibrium states (CVEs) in a mixed oligopoly model. It is different from a classical oligopoly in that a labormanaged firm is involved. The agents (including the labor-managed firm) when making decisions use conjectures about how the market clearing price can vary as a result of varying their supplies. The concept of equilibrium with the conjectures is different from the classical Cournot-Nash one. Under fixed feasible conjectures, the existence and uniqueness theorems for the conjectured variations equilibrium (called the exterior equilibrium) are proven. With an aim to specify a more complicated notion of the interior equilibrium, a consistency criterion for the conjectures (called also as influence coefficients) is proposed. The existence of at least one consistent conjectural variations equilibrium state (CCVE) is also established. Numerical experiments with a small test oligipoly are also described.
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