Entry Deterrence in a Cournot Model
- By Kazuhiro Ohnishi1
-
View Affiliations Hide Affiliations1 Institute for Basic Economic Science, 2 15-12 Hanjo, Minoo, Osaka 562-0044, Japan.
- Source: Firms' Strategic Decisions: Theoretical and Empirical Findings: Volume 1 , pp 98-113
- Publication Date: April 2015
- Language: English
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This chapter examines a two-stage quantity-competition model with an established firm and a potential entrant. Demand functions are divided into the following four cases: substitute goods and strategic complements, substitute goods and strategic substitutes, complementary goods and strategic substitutes and complementary goods and strategic complements. All these cases are correlated with two opposite strategic devices. This chapter discusses the entry-deterring behaviours resulting from strategic commitments by the established firm in all four cases.
Hardbound ISBN:
9781681080390
Ebook ISBN:
9781681080383
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